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In the year 2004, we have been treated to an unprecedented number of celebrity trials. 
Martha Stewart, Kobe Bryant, Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson1, Robert Blake, Courtney Love,
and Phil Spector have found themselves this year sitting across from prosecutors in high-profile 
criminal cases.2 The public seemingly has an insatiable appetite for these cases.3 Faced with 
public scrutiny, these celebrities are concerned about how their cases will play out in the court 
of public opinion.4 Accordingly, many celebrities hire not only attorneys to defend their cases in 
court, but also public relations experts to defend their cases in the public eye.5 The line between 
defending a celebrity case in court and defending a case to the public is becoming blurred.6
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 Although Scott Peterson was not a “celebrity” prior to being accused of killing his wife Laci, he soon 
became one. See Glenn Garvin, Jury Is In: Celebrity Trials a Hit for TV, The Miami Herald, Monday, June 14, 
2004, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/8916986.htm?1c.
2 See http://www.thejusticesystem.net. 
3
 Garvin, supra., and Joe Milicia, Celebrity Trials Proliferate 50 Years After Sheppard Case, The 
Associated Press, June 26, 2004, available at http://www.cleveland.com/newsflash/cleveland/index.ssf?/base/news-
11/108822565015770. See also, Janet Ball, Martha Stewart Pays Price of Fame, BBC News, UK Edition, Friday 
March 5, 2004, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3537903.stm.
4
 Joseph W. Martini and Charles F. Willson, Defending your Client in the Court of Public Opinion, 
Champion Magazine, The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, April 2004, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/93efa7fb3cld6al585256e9a004bfled?OpenDocument.
5
 Lynne Duke, Humble Pie for a Diva of Domesticity, Crash of High-Flying Martha Stewart Made Perfect 
Public Theater, (“This was not just a legal case, not just a judgment rendered. It was, alas, some kind of grist for the 
mill of modern media frenzy,”) Washington Post, Saturday, March 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35220-2004Mar5?language=printer. See also,  Lizzie Grubman 
((herself a “celebrity publicist”), who backed into a crowd at a Hamptons nightclub and hired damage-control expert 
Howard Rubenstein to “spread the word that the incident was an accident and that Grubman was truly sorry.”) John 
Springer, A Year After Hamptons Horror, Publicity Princess Could be Poised for a Plea Deal, available at 
http://www.courttv.com/trials/grubman/070202_ctv.html. See also, All Quiet at Martha Stewart’s as She Plans 
Strategy, (“The Daily News said Stewart will hold a teleconference with her attorneys and public relations advisers 
today to map a strategy to fight her felony convictions and rescue her reputation.”) Available at 
http://www.westportnow.com/business.
6 All Quiet at Martha Stewart’s as She Plans Strategy, Available at http://www.westportnow.com/business.
2Indeed, “the management team for a celebrity often hires a crisis-public- relations consultant to 
help the lawyer and client control the outflow of information to the media.”7 In 1994, the 
American Bar Association changed one of its ethical rules to allow an attorney to correct what 
he or she believes to be false publicity.8 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that courts 
have been presented with the question of whether statements made to public relations 
consultants are privileged under the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 In one high-profile case, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the attorney-client 
privilege extended to “oral communications among” the target of a grand jury investigation, her 
lawyers, and a public relations firm hired by her lawyers.”10
This article explores the issue of privilege for communications with public relations 
firms. Part I will discuss the history and underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege. In 
Part II of this article, the In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 case, as well as 
other similar cases, will be addressed. Part III will compare the recent opinions with the 
purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Finally, in Part IV, the article will conclude that 
expanding the attorney-client privilege to communications with public relations consultants is 
inadvisable and against the interests of justice.
7
 Steve Cron, Busted!, Entertainment and Sports Lawyer, A publication of the ABA Forum on the 
Entertainment and Sports Industries, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, Spring/Summer 2002. 
8
 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.6(a).
9 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 
2003); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Copper Market Antitrust 
Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds, 200 F.R.D. 661 (U.S.D.C. D. Kansas 2001); 
and Dorf & Stanton Communications v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. den. 520 U.S. 1275 
(1997).
10
 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2003), at 323.
3I. The History and Purposes of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth the general rules of privilege.11 The 
rule is simple. The rules of privilege are “governed by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”12
A. Bentham and Wigmore
The attorney-client privilege was well established at common law. Jeremy Bentham,13
an “early nineteenth-century British radical theorist,”14 and Dean John Henry Wigmore,15 an 
American scholar whose work has dominated American evidence law,16 were early legal 
scholars on theories of evidence.17 Their work heavily influenced the United States evidence 
laws. Bentham, who died before Dean Wigmore was born, opposed the very concept of an 
attorney-client privilege.18 He “subscribed to the truth theory of adjudication.”19 Bentham stated 
11
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 501.
12 Id.
13
 Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) has been described as a “utilitarian philosopher, political economist, 
lawyer, and legal reformer.” He wrote A Treatise on Judicial Evidence in 1825 and Rationale of Judicial Evidence
in 1827. See Literary Encyclopedia at http://www.LitEncyc.com
14
 Edward J. Imwinkelried and Glen Weissenberger, An Evidence Anthology, 7.
15
 Dean John Henry Wigmore (1863 – 1943) was a legal scholar and the Dean of Law at Northwestern 
University until 1929. He wrote Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 
which is commonly referred to as Wigmore on Evidence. See http://www.britannica.com and 
http://www.encyclopedia.com.
16
 Imwinkelried and Weissenberger, supra., 
17
 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham & Wigmore, at 25 and 110. 
18 Id., at 99. “He places little weight on values which constrain the uninhibited pursuit of truth. He is 
opposed to rules of privilege designed to protect marital harmony or confidential relationships; and he makes it quite 
clear that such factors should normally be given less weight than rectitude of decision. He is particularly harsh on 
the lawyer-client privilege and gives no quarter to the claim that this may serve to increase rectitude of decision in 
the long term; he is dismissive of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence and gives short 
shrift to many of the specific provisions that would today be subsumed under such notions as due process, natural 
justice and process values, except in so far as they would promote rectitude of decision.” Some illustrious writers, 
namely John Stuart Mill, Justice John Appleton, Edward Livingston, and professors Edmund Morgan and Charles 
McCormick have shared Bentham’s views. See Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice 
and Procedure, vol. 24, §5472, at 87.
19
 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence, Evidentiary Privileges, § 2.5, at 
113. See also, U.S. v. Gray, 857 F. Supp. 852 (D. Utah 1994). (“To Bentham rectitude of decision and truth were the 
highest values of the judicial process”).
4the following: 
The man by the supposition is guilty; if not, by the supposition there is nothing to 
betray; let the law adviser say every thing he has heard, every thing he can have 
heard from his client, the client cannot have any thing to fear from it. That it will
often happen that in the case supposed no such confidence will be reposed, is 
natural enough; the first thing the advocate or attorney will say to his client, will 
be, ‘Remember that, whatever you say to me, I shall be obliged to tell, if asked 
about it.’ What, then, will be the consequence? That a guilty person will not in 
general be able to derive quite so much assistance from this law adviser, in the 
way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at present.20
In contrast, Dean Wigmore embraced the attorney-client privilege and defended its use.21
However, he did believe that the use of privileges should be limited.22 He stated the following:
For three hundred years it has now been recognized as a fundamental 
maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to 
every man’s evidence.
It follows, on the one hand, that all privileges of exemption from this duty 
are exceptional, and are therefore to be discountenanced. There must be good 
reason, plainly shown, for their existence. . . The investigation of truth and the 
enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of 
these privileges. They should be recognized only within the narrowest limits 
required by principle.23
Dean Wigmore traced the concept of the attorney-client privilege back to the “reign of 
Elizabeth.”24 Because oral testimony as a method of proof did not appear as a common source 
of proof until the early 1500s, the concept of privileges arose at approximately the same time as
20
 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, b. IX, pt. IV, c. 5, as quoted in John Henry Wigmore, A 
Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, published by Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1905, §2291, at 3200. This passage also appears in Eric D. Green, Charles R. Nesson, and Peter L. 
Murray, Problems, Cases and Materials on Evidence, Third Ed., at 620.
21
 Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-
Client Privilege (And Why it is Misguided), 48 Vill. L. Rev. 469, 477 (2003).
22
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra, at § 3.1, at 121.
23
 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, 
published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, §2192, at 2968.
24
 Wigmore, supra., at §2290, at 3193. Max Radin, a law professor at the University of California at 
Berkeley from 1919 through 1948, believed that the attorney-client privilege may have originated in Roman law –
“It was one of the commonplaces of the Roman law that a servant – who was, to be sure, a slave – might not give 
testimony against his master.” Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 Cal. L. Rev. 487, 487 – 488.
5the concept of testimonial evidence.25 The first cases involving the attorney-client privilege 
arose during the late 1500s after the enactment of the Statute of Perjury.26
B. Early English Common Law
The attorney-client privilege began not as a protection for a client, but as “obligations of 
honor among gentlemen.”27 The honor was such that a lawyer would never reveal a client’s 
secrets – to do so would be dishonorable.28 The privilege belonged to the attorney,29 not the 
client, as is the case today. Gentlemen would not divulge a client’s secrets.
By 1776, the privilege all but disappeared.30 In the interesting Duchess of Kingston’s 
Case,31 a bigamy trial, Lord Barrington, an old friend of the accused, was asked, “Did you ever 
hear from the lady at the bar that she was married to Mr. Hervey?” He responded, “If anything 
has been confided to my honor, or confidentially told me, I do hold, with humble submission to 
your lordships, that as a man of honor, as a man regardful of the laws of society, I cannot reveal 
it.”32 Despite his gentlemanly protest, Lord Barrington was ordered to answer all questions.33 A
year later, in Hill’s Trial,34 the court stated the following:
Gentlemen, one has only to say further, that if this point of honor was to be so 
sacred as that a man who comes by knowledge of this sort from an offender was 
not to be at liberty to disclose it, the most atrocious criminals would every day 
25 Id., at 3194; and Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, Second Ed., at 7.
26
 Rice, supra., at 11.
27
 Wigmore, supra., at §2286, at 3187.   
28
 Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, Second Ed., at 6.
29
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra.,  § 2.3, at 108.
30
 Duchess of Kingston’s Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586, 1776, as quoted in John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise 
on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, 
§2286, at 3188.
31
 Duchess of Kingston’s Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586, 1776, as quoted in John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise 
on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law,  Volume IV, published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, 
§2286, at 3188.
32 Id.
33 Id., at 3189.
34
 Hill’s Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362, as quoted in John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, §2286, at 3188.
6escape punishment; and therefore it is that the wisdom of the law knows nothing 
of that point of honor.
The “point of honor” approach thus disappeared forever as a motive for recognizing a 
privilege.”35 That purpose was no longer considered valid.36
A case that has received a significant amount of attention37 is Annesley v. Earl of 
Anglesea, decided in 1743.38 Although one commentator indicates that with Annesley, the 
privilege was “nearly wiped out,”39 the case actually set some boundaries with respect to the 
privilege that are still in effect today.40 The Annesley case, tried before the Barons of the Irish 
Exchequer,41 had interesting facts. 
At issue was who succeeded to certain property owned by Arthur, Baron of Altham, 
after he died.42 The plaintiff was a lessee of James Annesley, and the defendant was Richard, 
Earl of Anglesea.43 Richard was entitled to the land of Arthur if Arthur died childless.44 The 
plaintiff claimed that Richard did not die childless, and that James was in fact the natural son of 
Arthur.45 The issue of the attorney-client privilege arose because Richard retained an attorney, 
John Giffard, to advise him on numerous matters.46 Plaintiff asserted that Richard retained 
35
 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, 
published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, §2286, at 3189.
36
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon Shargel v. U.S., 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984), at 63.
37
 Wigmore, supra., at § 2310, at 3231; and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, at 1073.
38
 Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1229 (1743).
39
 Hazard, supra.
40 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1956); and Kansas v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 91 
(1913).
41
 Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330, 333 (1864).
42
 Hazard, supra., at 1074.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
7Giffard in order to have James falsely arrested on murder charges, and then hanged.47 Giffard 
was willing to testify for the plaintiff, but Richard objected.48
Lord Chief Baron Bowes, who wrote the majority opinion allowing the testimony,49
stated the following:
Now, admitting the policy of the law in protecting secrets disclosed by the 
client to his attorney, to be, as has been said, in favour of the client, and 
principally for his service, and that the attorney is in loco of the client, and 
therefore his trustee, does it follow from thence, that everything said by a client to 
his attorney falls under the same reason? I own, I think not; because there is not 
the same necessity upon the client to trust him in one case as in the other . . . 50
The court distinguished between consulting an attorney for legal advice and consulting an 
attorney as an acquaintance.51 In the event the subject matter of the conversation was different 
from that for which the attorney was employed, the conversation would not be privileged, said 
the court.52
The more fascinating opinion, and the one more often cited, is the concurring opinion 
written by Baron Mounteney.53 He set forth a hypothetical fact pattern in which a client 
approaches numerous attorneys and asks them to carry out a criminal act.54 As each declines, 
the attorneys would then be obliged to “keep this inviolably secret,” if the attorney-client 
privilege applied.55 The client could effectively escape prosecution by consulting every attorney 
in a jurisdiction until he found an attorney “wicked enough to carry this iniquitous scheme into 
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id, at 1078.
50
 Wigmore, supra., at § 2310, at 3231.
51 Id.
52
 Hazard, supra.
53 Id.
54
 Sawyer v. Barczak, at 808.
55 Id.
8execution.”56 That, said Baron Mounteney, would be contrary to both law and reason.57 The 
Annesley case formed the basis of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege that 
we have today.58 Sergeant Tisdall stated the following:
If the witness is employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, 
his duty to the public obliges him to disclose it; no private obligations can 
dispense with that universal one which lies on every member of the society, to 
discover every design which may be formed contrary to the laws of the society to 
destroy the public welfare.59
Far from nearly wiping out the attorney-client privilege, the barons were ahead of their time. 
The court also recognized in this case that the true purpose of the rule was to foster honest 
communication between the client and the attorney.60
C. United States Common Law
Written evidence laws in the United States can be traced back to the year 1789.61 This 
was the period of time when Congress was forming federal courts, and “[t]hough overshadowed 
by constitutional policy and practical politics, technical details of practice and procedure such as 
rules of evidence were involved in both the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Bill of Rights.”62
Some evidentiary rules such as the right of confrontation and the right against self-
incrimination, received “constitutional status.”63 These were a departure from English law.64
The federal courts looked to English law when making evidentiary rulings, but there was 
selective incorporation rather than wholesale adoption.65
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g. U.S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989). See also, Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client 
Privilege and the Work-Produce Doctrine, 4th Ed., American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, at 416 – 418. 
59
 Annesley, supra., Sergeant Tisdall quoted in Kansas v. Wilcox, supra.
60
 Annesley, supra.
61
 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, vol. 21, §5001, at 3.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id., at 5.
65 Id.
9According to Dean Wigmore, the attorney-client privilege arose only a few times during 
the late 1700s.66 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., another evidence expert, has found that “recognition 
of the privilege was slow and halting until after 1800.”67 The concept of an attorney-client 
privilege as we know it today was reborn, according to Dean Wigmore, under a new theory in 
the mid 1800s.68 He states the following:
That new theory looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the client’s 
freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser, and proposed to assure 
this by removing the risk of disclosure by the attorney even at the hands of the 
law.69
Two cases decided by Lord Brougham in 1833 form the basis of this new theory and the 
attorney-client privilege today.70 The first was Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool,71 a civil case 
brought by the Corporation of Liverpool to recover some dues and tolls from merchants.72 Prior 
to bringing the case, the corporation sought written advice from its counsel.73 The merchants 
then sought discovery of this advice.74 Lord Brougham denied their request, stating the 
following:
It seems plain, that the course of justice must stop if such a right exists. No man 
will dare to consult a professional adviser with a view to his defence or to the 
enforcement of his rights.75
66
 Wigmore, supra., at 3189 – 3195; however, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., in his An Historical Perspective on 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, states that “For 50 years after 1743 there appears to be no 
reported decision clearly sustaining a claim of privilege, although there are cases permitting an attorney to refuse to 
supply documents in response to a subpoena.” 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, at 1080.
67
 Hazard, supra., at 1070.
68
 Wigmore, supra., at 3189 – 3195. However, this theory seems to have emanated from Annesley v. Earl 
of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1229 (1743), see above. See also: Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 24, §5472, at 72, 
“Recent scholarship suggests that Wigmore has exaggerated greatly the degree to which the privilege was accepted 
prior to 1800” (citing to Hazard).
69 Id., at 3194.
70
 Hazard, supra., at 1083.
71
 Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch. 1833).
72
 Hazard, supra., at 1083.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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The second case was Greenough v. Gaskell,76 a civil case brought to cancel a note.77
Interestingly, the items sought by the petitioner in that case were financial papers and records of 
the client that were being held by the solicitor.78 Again, Lord Brougham held the papers 
immune from disclosure.79 He stated the following:
If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal 
resources. Deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to 
consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half his case.80
The attorney-client privilege appeared for the first time in a reported United States 
decision in Dixon v. Parmelee,81 a New England case decided in 1829. The American Court 
relied on the Annesley82 decision and found that the privilege did not apply to the particular 
factual situation in Dixon.83 However, the court did clearly embrace the attorney-client privilege 
when it stated the following:
It has long been the established law, that counselors, solicitors and attorneys, 
ought not to be permitted to discover the secrets of their clients: it is declared 
repugnant to the policy of the law, to permit the disclosure of secrets by him 
whom the law has intrusted therewith. It is the privilege of the client, that 
the mouth of his counsel should be forever sealed against the disclosure of things 
necessarily communicated to him for the better conducting his cause, pendente 
lite: but this privilege, in all the cases which have fallen under my observation, 
has been strictly confined to the period in which the suit has been pending, and to 
the party of record, or in interest; and where the substance of the communication 
was such that it became necessary for the attorney to know it in order to manage 
the suit.84
76
 Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833).
77
 Hazard, supra., at 1083.
78 Id., at 1084. The facts of the case are interesting because the papers and financial records would likely 
not be protected by the attorney-client privilege today. See Colton v. U.S., 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2nd Cir. 1962).
79 Id.
80
 Wigmore, supra., at 3197.
81
 Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829), as presented in Hazard, supra., at 1088.
82
 Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1229 (1743).
83
 Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185, 190 (1829).
84 Id., at 188.
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In Dixon, the court reasoned that attorneys were necessary “mouthpieces” for their clients.85 It 
appears that this court was looking at the privilege from the point of view of the “master-servant 
relationship” of Roman law, rather than the point of view of “encouraging clients to make full 
disclosures” used today.86 The court indicated that the “origins of the law” are as follows:
…in early days, suitors brought in person their complaints before the King, and 
afterwards his court; that as business increased, the administration of justice 
approximating to a science, and the necessity of forms sensibly felt, it became 
absolutely necessary that there should be a set of men to stand in the place of 
suitors, called attorneys, and manage their causes; to encourage which, and bring 
the same into practice, it also became necessary for courts to adopt a rule, by way 
of pledge to suitors, that their secret and confidential communications to their 
attorneys should not be drawn from them, either with or without the consent of 
such attorney.87
The court did make it clear that the privilege belonged to the client, not the attorney, as had 
been the case in the past.88
The first “important” treatise on evidence law was published in 1842 by Simon 
Greenleaf of Harvard Law School.89 During this same year, the Supreme Court was given 
“broad rule-making power, which included the regulation of “forms and modes of taking and 
obtaining evidence.”90 In 1898, James B. Thayer, another Harvard Professor of Law, wrote A 
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law.91 Thayer is “considered the first true 
giant in American evidence law.”92 He indicated that the law of evidence is really a study of 
what is excluded from a trial, rather than what is included.93 His “most erudite disciple,”94 John 
85 Id.
86
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served upon Shargel v. U.S., 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2nd Cir. 1984), 
citing to J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence, Sec. 503(02) (1982).
87
 Dixon, supra. See also, Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330, 333 (1864).
88 Id.
89
 Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5001, at 20.
90 Id., at 22.
91
 James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law  (1898), partially reprinted in 
Edward J. Imwinkelried and Glen Weissenberger, An Evidence Anthology, at 1.
92
 Imwinkelried and Weissenberger, supra.
93 Id., at 2.
12
Henry Wigmore, became America’s foremost authority on evidence law.95 Armed with English 
and American case law, as well as Professor Thayer’s teachings, Wigmore developed “four 
fundamental conditions” of privilege law.96 These conditions, later cited in numerous court 
cases,97 are the following:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered; and
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation.98
D. Codification of the Rules of Evidence
The process of codifying rules of evidence began with Jeremy Bentham’s offer to 
President Madison to “codify the American common law” in 1811.99 President Madison 
declined to accept the offer.100 Many attempts were made at codification throughout the 
years,101 but it was not until the Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted by the American Law 
Institute in 1953 and endorsed by the American Bar Association, that strides were made towards 
codification.102 The Uniform Rules did not take hold (having been approved by only two states), 
but they did form the basis of many of our federal rules of evidence today.103
94 Id., at 7.
95
 Edmund M. Morgan and John A. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. 
Rev. 909 (1937), reprinted in part in Imwinkelried and Weissenberger, supra.
96
 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume IV, 
published by Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, §2285, at 3185.
97 See, e.g.,  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 
1064 (9th Cir. 1976); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970); and Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American 
Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
98
 Wigmore, supra. Emphasis in original.
99
 Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5005, at 62. 
100 Id.
101 Id., at 62 – 92.
102 Id., at 90.
103 Id., at 90 – 91.
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The drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence as we know them today began in 1958, 
when the “American Bar Association adopted a resolution urging the United States Judicial 
Conference to consider adopting a uniform set of evidentiary rules for federal courts.”104 In 
1961, the Judicial Conference authorized a committee to investigate this possibility, and United 
States Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren appointed the committee.105 The committee released 
its report less than nine months later, indicating that it was “both feasible and advisable to 
promulgate a set of uniform rules.”106 This standing committee recommended to the Judicial 
Conference that an Advisory Committee be appointed to write the rules.107 Chief Justice Warren 
appointed the members of the committee, naming Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Chairman.108 It has been 
said that the membership of the committee reflected the influence of both Jeremy Bentham and 
Dean Wigmore.109
The members of the Committee were rather conservative,110 and Albert Jenner was 
quoted as saying that the Committee was not “inclined to give the family jewels away or tip or 
rock the laws of evidence.”111 Most of the work of the Committee was done by Professor 
104
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra. §4.2.1(a), at 150.
105 Id., at 151. In actuality, the Chief Justice “chose instead to constitute the Chairman of the existing 
Advisory Committee as a Special Committee on Evidence, with Professor James Wm. Moore of the Yale Law 
School as Chairman.” Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5005, at 92.
106 Id. and Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5006, at 92.
107
 Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5006, at 97.
108 Id. Jenner formed Jenner and Block, a leading law firm in Chicago.
109
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra. §4.2.1(b), at 153. The members of the Committee were Albert 
E. Jenner, Jr. (chair), Professor Edward W. Cleary (recorder), Professor Jack Weinstein, David Berger, Hicks Epton, 
Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Chief Judge Joe Ewing Estes, Judge Robert Van Pelt, Professor Thomas F. Green, 
Associate Dean Charles W. Joiner, Robert S. Erdahl, Egbert L. Haywood, Frank G. Raichle, Herman F. Selvin, 
Craig Spangenberg, and Edward Bennett Williams. Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5006, at 98.
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Cleary.112 Professor Cleary later testified at a House subcommittee meeting that privileges 
“often operated as blockades to the quest for truth.”113
A draft of the rules was submitted for comment in 1969, with Article V of that draft 
containing the privilege rules.114 A revised draft, which reflected some comments from the bar, 
was submitted by the Judicial Conference to the Supreme Court in 1970.115 Instead of 
promulgating the rules and sending them on to the Congress, as was provided by the Rules 
Enabling Act, the Court returned the rules to the Judicial Conference with instructions to 
publish them for comment.116 The Justice Department made many requests for changes, and 
these changes were reflected in a third version of the rules.117 “[V]irtually all the major changes 
that would subsequently be made “reflect[ed] the wishes of Senator McClellan and the 
Department of Justice.”118 Senator McClellan was the Chair of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee.119 Minor changes continued to be made
at the request of the Justice Department.120
Article V of the drafts of the rules had thirteen separate provisions. Nine of the 
provisions addressed specific privileges, one of which was the attorney-client privilege (5-
03).121 In a March 1971 revised draft, Rule 5-03 became 503, and the drafters added a fourth 
section. The following is a text of the attorney-client privilege rule at this point:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications (1) between himself or his representative 
112 Id., at 100.
113
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra.
114 Id., at 154.
115
  Wright and Graham, supra, at 101.
116 Id.
117 Id., at 103.
118
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra., at 165.
119 Id.
120 Id., at 166 – 170; and Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5006, at 103.
121 Id., at 154.
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and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the 
lawyer’s representative, or (3) made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client, by him or his lawyer to a lawyer 
representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4) between 
representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the 
client.122
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court approved the “green book” of rules, which 
contained the above language, and on February 5, 1973, the Chief Justice sent the rules to 
Congress.123 Justice Douglas filed a dissent when the rules were transmitted.124 Justice Douglas 
dissented because he believed the rules needed to be developed on a “case-by-case basis” by the 
courts.125 He thought that if any body was responsible for drafting rules, it was the Congress.126
The Rules Enabling Act did not give the Supreme Court the power to issue rules of evidence, he 
believed, because these rules were actually substantive in nature, rather than procedural.127
Finally, he thought that the Supreme Court was merely a “conduit” between the Committee and 
Congress and had not appropriately considered the rules.128
E. The Watergate Effect
The years 1972 and 1973 were significant for their effect on privilege law.129 On June 
17, 1972, the Watergate burglars were caught and arrested as they attempted to bug Democratic 
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel in Washington, D.C.130 On June 3, 
1973, John Dean, the White House Counsel, told the Watergate investigators that he and 
122 Id., at 161.
123 Id., at 170 -171; and Wright and Graham, supra., at vol. 21, §5006, at 104.
124 Id., at 171; and Wright and Graham, supra..
125 Id., and Wright and Graham, supra..
126 Id., and Wright and Graham, supra..
127
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra.
128 Id.
129
 Wright and Graham, supra.
130 Watergate Timeline: The Details, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/watergate/chronology.htm.
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President Nixon had discussed the cover-up at least 35 times.131 President Nixon refused to turn 
over the presidential tape recordings on July 23, 1973, citing executive privilege,132 Special 
Prosecutor Archibald Cox issued a subpoena to J. Fred Buzhart, presidential counsel, and the 
Senate Watergate Committee issued a subpoena to Leonard Garment, another Nixon lawyer.133
In the landmark case United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the executive 
privilege was not absolute, and it ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes and records.134
The Watergate events had a definite effect on the privilege rules. Senator Sam Ervin was 
both Chairman of the Watergate Committee and the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.135
He introduced Senate Bill 583 in order to delay the effective date of the rules that had been 
promulgated by the Supreme Court.136 A similar provision was passed in the House, and a 
report prepared at that time indicated that the delay was intended “to promote the separation of 
constitutional powers.”137 The Congressional debates on the rules contained numerous 
references to the Watergate controversy.138
F. Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 501
On June 28, 1973, the Judiciary Committee released a “Committee Print of the Federal 
Rules.”139 The House amended the earlier privilege provisions, and the 13 specific privilege 
rules were eliminated and replaced with a provision almost identical to Federal Rule of 
131 Id.
132
 Carroll Kilpatrick, President Refuses to Turn Over Tapes; Ervin Committee, Cox Issue Subpoenas, 
Washington Post, July 24, 1973, at A-01, available at www.washingtonpost.com
133 Id.
134
 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (July 24, 1974).
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 Kilpatrick, supra, and Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra., at 165 and 176.
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 Wright and Graham, supra, at 105.
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 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra., at 174.
138
 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should be Conceived as a Perpetual 
Index Code: Blindness is Worse than Myopia, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1595, 1601 (1999).
139
 Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, supra., at 181.
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Evidence 501.140 Further, the House also adopted an amendment stating that the Supreme Court 
could not promulgate court rules on privileges without “affirmative approval by Congress.”141
Congress was clearly marking out what it saw as its “turf” when it decreed “[a]ny. . . rule 
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless 
approved by Act of Congress.”142 The Committee Print was adopted by the House and the 
Senate and was signed by President Ford on January 2, 1975, to take effect on July 1, 1975.143
As of this writing, the courts have decided privilege law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 
according to common law, “in light of reason and experience,” for thirty years.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests 
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”144 The lawyer must be aware of all the 
facts and circumstances in order to adequately represent his or her client.145 The need for this 
privilege was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1888.146 Charles Wright and Kenneth 
Graham, two leading commentators on federal practice and procedure, refer to the above 
rationales for the privilege as the “instrumental argument.”147 The instrumental argument has 
the following five steps:
1. The law is complex. A layperson would find it almost impossible to 
understand the law and procedure involved in a trial.
2. It is in the public’s interest that a layperson understand the law and the 
best way to assure his/her understanding is to enlist the help of persons 
“learned in the law.”
140 Id.,and Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 501.
141 Id.,  at 183.
142
 Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules, supra, at 1602.
143
 Wright and Graham, supra, at 108.
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 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
145 Id., citing to Trammel v. U.S. 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
146 Id., citing to Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
147
 Wright and Graham, supra, at Vol. 24, at 80.
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3. In order to provide the best advice, the lawyer needs to know all the 
facts, both good and bad.
4. Without the privilege, clients would only reveal those facts that are 
favorable to their case.
5. The benefits society receives through the attorney-client privilege 
outweigh the costs to society of suppression of the communication.148
As mentioned above, the privilege belongs to the client, and the attorney is expected to 
safeguard it on behalf of the client.149 Utmost candor between the attorney and the client is 
absolutely essential if a client is to have effective assistance of counsel.150
On the other hand, because it “impedes full and free discovery of the truth,” the 
attorney-client privilege is to be strictly construed.151  The burden of proving that the privilege
applies is on the party asserting the privilege.152 Privileges “are not favored,” even if they have 
constitutional roots.153  Courts are to confine the privilege to its “narrowest possible limits 
consistent with the logic of its principle.”154 Without limitations, the privilege would “engulf all 
manner of services performed for (sic) the lawyer that are not now, and should not be, 
summarily excluded from the adversary process.”155
148 Id., at 80 – 86.
149
 Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Produce Doctrine, 4th Ed., American 
Bar Association, Section of Litigation, at 3.
150
 Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 838 F.2d 13, 
21 (1st Cir. 1988).
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 Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981).
152 Id. at 25.
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 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979), citing to Wigmore and Bentham. However, see also
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 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984).
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II. The Question of Whether Communications with Public Relations Agents Are
Protected Under the Attorney-Client Privilege
A. The In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 2003 Case
Judge Kaplan, a United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New 
York, presided over a motion for order to show cause filed by the United States Attorney 
against a public relations firm and its employee.156 In the In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated 
March 24, 2003 case (Grand Jury March 24 case), the U. S. Attorney had served grand jury 
subpoenas on the public relations firm and its employee in order to discover the substance of 
conversations the public relations firm had had with both the target of a grand jury investigation 
and the target’s attorney.157 The grand jury was investigating a “high-profile matter,” and the 
name of the target as well as any other identifiable facts were redacted from the original 
opinion, which was filed under seal.158 One need only Shepardize the case to learn that the high-
profile client was actually Martha Stewart. The public relations firm declined to testify and to 
produce documents.159 It asserted that it was hired by the target’s attorneys as part of the 
defense team, and that conversations and communications it had were protected by the attorney-
client privilege.160 Judge Kaplan initially ordered the public relations firm employee to appear 
before the grand jury and indicated that the employee could assert any objection at that time.161
Judge Kaplan then held an in camera inspection of the documents, and held that some of the 
documents were protected, not by the attorney-client privilege, but by the attorney work product 
156
 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2003).
157 Id. at 322.
158 Id., at 322 and 323.
159 Id. at 323.
160 Id. The public relations firm was likely Citigate Sard Verbinnen, a crisis consulting firm. Bruce 
Horovitz, Stewart Uploads her Cause to Web Site, USA Today, Money, June 6, 2003, available at: 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2003-06-05-marthareact_x.htm.
161 Id.
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privilege.162 He then ordered the parties to indicate whether they still had a disagreement with 
respect to the remaining documents.163 The public relations firm and its employee continued to 
press their objections to the U.S. Attorney requests.164
In an interesting twist, the target’s attorneys claimed that they had hired the public 
relations firm not to influence the public in general, but to influence the prosecutors and 
regulators.165 According to the target’s attorneys, the public relations firm was hired because the 
news reports concerning the target were biased and inaccurate.166 They claimed that because of 
the inaccurate reports, the public was unfairly pressuring the prosecutor to file charges against 
their client.167
The public relations firm had at least two conversations directly 168with the target and 
sent at least one e-mail directly to the target. Other communications involved conversations 
with the target’s attorneys in the absence of the target.169 Still other situations involved meetings 
with the attorneys, the target, and the target’s spouse.170 The public relations firm then 
disseminated to the media information requested by the attorneys.171  All of this was done in the 
hope of influencing the prosecutor’s decision as to whether to charge the target. The court 
ultimately found that the attorney-client privilege covered both conversations between the 
162 Id. The attorney work product privilege originated in the Hickman v. Taylor case, a Supreme Court case 
in which the Court held that written statements of witnesses to a tugboat sinking and an attorney’s written 
memoranda regarding these oral statements were not discoverable by opposing counsel. This protection is qualified, 
however, and in the event an adversary shows a sufficient need for the material, the material will no longer be 
protected. See, Epstein, supra., at 479 – 481.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 324.
169 Id.
170 Id. As Martha Stewart did not have a spouse at the time of this motion, presumably the person 
accompanying Ms. Stewart was her daughter, Alexis.
171 Id.
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attorneys and the public relations consultant and conversations between the target and the public 
relations consultant.172
Because of these peculiar circumstances as argued by the attorneys, this decision should 
be limited to its facts, and any influence on other cases would ordinarily be limited. However, 
public relations firms, thrilled with the result in the case, have highly publicized it.173
Accordingly, it appears likely that courts will face this question on a continuing basis. 
Additionally, the use of public relations firms is a relatively new device used by clients in high-
profile cases.174 There will undoubtedly be a push to protect those communications.
The Judge in Grand Jury March 24 made two key findings in deciding the case. First, he 
relied on the U.S. v. Kovel case; and second, he found that the public relations activities 
qualified as “legal advice.”175
1. The U.S. v. Kovel Case
In the Grand Jury March 24 case, Judge Kaplan relied heavily on U.S. v. Kovel,176 a 
case in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client privilege 
extended to conversations between a client and accountants retained by the attorney.177 The 
Kovel case has been cited extensively since it was decided in 1961, but it does not represent a 
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Tries & Rice, LLC, citing to a Wisconsin Law Journal article about the Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Dated March 24, 2003 case. Available at http://www.trpr.biz/focus.html.
174 E.g., All Quiet at Martha Stewart’s as She Plans Strategy, “The Daily News said Stewart will hold a 
teleconference with her attorneys and public relations advisers today to map a strategy to fight her felony 
convictions and rescue her reputation.” Available at http://www.westportnow.com/business; Tom Melsheimer, How 
Prominent Execs Can Avoid Martha Stewart’s Fate, Fish & Richardson P.C. – Articles & News, available at 
http://www.fr.com/news/articledetail.cfm?articleid=299; Jessica Martin, High-Profile Celebrity Trials Test Lawyers’ 
Skills with “unique set of challenges,’ Washington University in St. Louis, News & Information, available at: 
http://www.news-info.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/640.html; and Gail Diane Cox, Blogs Dot the Litigation 
Landscape, The National Law Journal, July 29, 2004, available at: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1090180185467.
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great change to attorney-client privilege law.178 The holding in Kovel is actually quite limited. 
The Court likened the accountant’s role in the case to that of a translator.179 In fact, Judge 
Friendly, who wrote the Kovel opinion, stated that “[a]ccounting concepts are a foreign 
language to some lawyers in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases.”180
The Kovel Court recognized the balancing that is necessary in attorney-client privilege 
cases.181 On the one hand, there is the search for truth, but on the other hand, there is the need 
for attorneys due to of the complexity and difficulty of our laws.182 Recognizing the need for 
accountants to explain complex tax issues to the attorney, the court found that an accountant’s 
communications, made in order to enable the attorney to provide legal advice, are protected by 
the attorney-client privilege.183 The privilege in this case has been referred to as a “derivative” 
privilege.184 The court was quick to limit the scope of its holding, stating the following:
Nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys, simply by placing 
accountants, scientists or investigators on their payrolls and maintaining them in 
their offices, should be able to invest all communications by clients to such 
persons with a privilege the law has not seen fit to extend when the latter are 
operating under their own steam.185
The court also distinguished between a case in which a client consults with an accountant prior 
to retaining the lawyer (no privilege applies) and one where the client retains the lawyer and the 
lawyer hires the accountant (privilege applies).186 Additionally, the court cautioned that “if the 
advice sought is the accountant’s, rather than the lawyer’s, no privilege exists.”187
178 See Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment: Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of 
United States v. Kovel, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 977, Summer 2003.
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2. Kovel’s Progeny
In the years since Kovel was decided, it has been cited numerous times by courts, both 
with respect to accountants and with respect to others.188 Some commentators believe that 
courts have strictly limited the scope of Kovel.189 For example, in U.S. v. Ackert, decided as was 
Kovel by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the court refused to extend the Kovel holding to
communications with an investment banker.190 In Ackert, the I.R.S. was auditing Paramount 
Communications, Inc. for losses it claimed on its tax returns from 1989 through 1992.191 During 
the audit, the I.R.S. agent issued a summons to David A. Ackert, an investment banker formerly 
employed by Goldman, Sachs, and Co.192 Mr. Ackert refused to comply with the summons, and 
Paramount claimed that any communication between Mr. Ackert and Eugene I. Meyers, its tax 
counsel, was protected by the attorney-client privilege.193 During 1989, Mr. Ackert, while 
working for Goldman, Sachs, met with Paramount about an investment proposal that he said 
would save the company federal income taxes.194 Paramount eventually entered into a 
transaction with another investment banking firm, but paid Goldman, Sachs $1.5 million for its
earlier investment advice.195
Paramount argued that the facts of the case were similar to Kovel, and the magistrate 
judge agreed.196 The Second Circuit reversed, clarifying its earlier Kovel opinion.197 It held that 
188 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 1999); Occidental Chemical Corp. v. OHM, 175 F.R.D. 
431 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); and Cavallaro v. U.S., 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002).
189 See, e.g., Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment: Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise 
of United States v. Kovel, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 977, 978, Summer 2003; and Carl Pacini, Accountants, Attorney-Client 
Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure Via Electronic Communication, 28 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 893, 907 (2003).
190
 U.S. v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 1999).
191 Id., at 138.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
24
in Kovel the accountant was merely clarifying communication between the client and the 
attorney.198 The court compared the accountant’s role to that of a translator.199 The court found, 
as the magistrate had, that Mr. Meyers had interviewed Mr. Ackert so that he could better 
advise his client, Paramount.200 However, the court stated that this was not enough to fall within 
Kovel, stating the following:
[t]he privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not 
communications that prove important to an attorney’s legal advice to a client…a 
communication between an attorney and a third party does not become shielded 
by the attorney-client privilege solely because the communication proves 
important to the attorney’s ability to represent the client.201
In Ackert, the information provided by the investment banker was “not possessed by either the 
attorney or the client.” 202 Mr. Ackert did not act as a translator between the client Paramount 
and the attorney Mr. Meyers.203 Therefore, the court did not extend the privilege.
In another case, this time involving an independent contractor, the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the privilege applied, although the court found so because of an agency-
type relationship, not because of a translator-type relationship.204 In this case Bieter Company, a
partnership, was attempting to develop a parcel of land in Minnesota.205 The company worked 
closely with Dennis S. Klohs, who was an independent contractor, not an employee of nor a 
partner in Bieter.206 The company later asserted that the local government blocked the 
197 Id., at 140.
198 Id., at 139.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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development, suing the government for RICO207 Act violations.208 Partners in Bieter, and Mr. 
Klohs, had both met with the attorneys for Bieter Company, Dorsey & Whitney.209
The local government requested documents from Mr. Klohs, and he refused to produce 
them, asserting the attorney-client privilege.210 The Magistrate, followed by the District Court, 
issued orders compelling discovery.211 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that 
communications between Klohs and the law firm were privileged.212 The court found as a fact 
that Klohs had worked closely with the partner in Bieter, both before and in the early stages of 
the litigation, and was therefore a representative of Bieter.213 Applying the United States 
Supreme Court case Upjohn v. United States,214 the court found that communications with 
Klohs fell within the privilege.215
A United States District Court in Colorado relied on In re Bieter Co. when it ruled on a 
motion to compel production of documents in a Federal Tort Claims Act case.216 In Horton v. 
U.S., Coolidge Evergreen Equities, LLC was one of the plaintiffs that sued the United States for 
the alleged contamination of its property located adjacent to Lowry Air Force Base.217 The 
United States served a subpoena on Dunmire Property Management Co., and Dunmire objected 
to the request, citing the attorney-client privilege.218 Dunmire was not one of the plaintiffs; it 
argued that as the managing agent for Coolidge for two apartment buildings, its correspondence 
207
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with the Hannon law firm, Coolidge’s attorneys, was privileged.219 The District Court cited to 
the Bieter case, finding that Dunmire had the burden to show both that it was the “functional 
equivalent of an employee” and that the information sought by the U.S. was information subject 
to the attorney-client privilege.220 The court ultimately found that Dunmire failed to show that it 
was the functional equivalent of an employee.221
Dunmire had submitted two documents to the court in its attempt to meet its burden.222
The first was a Property Management Agreement between Coolidge Evergreen and Dunmire 
providing that Dunmire was Coolidge Evergreen’s agent to “rent, lease, operate and manage the 
property.”223 The second document was a letter from Coolidge Evergreen to Dunmire stating 
that Crystal Dunmire and her company were the “owner’s agent for handling the lawsuit with 
the federal government.”224 The court labeled this second document “self-serving” because it 
was dated after the dispute arose.225 Because the court found that Dunmire failed to prove it was 
the functional equivalent of an employee, it did not reach the second question of whether the 
information exchanged was the type of information subject to the attorney-client privilege.226
A case decided by the D.C. Circuit, Linde Thomson v. Resolution Trust Corp., involved 
the question of whether communications with an insurer come within the attorney-client 
privilege.227 In Linde Thomson, a federal savings and loan institution failed, and Resolution 
Trust Corporation, an entity established by Congress to investigate such failures, looked into the 
219 Id.
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failure.228 Resolution Trust issued an administrative subpoena to Linde Thomson, a law firm 
with connections to the savings and loan institution.229 Linde Thomson refused to comply with 
the subpoena, and Resolution Trust sued to enforce its subpoenas.230 It first claimed that there 
was an insured-insurer privilege, and when it appeared likely this argument would fail, it argued 
that the privilege applied to communications between it and its liability insurer pursuant to the 
attorney-client privilege.231 Although the court acknowledged that there might be instances in
which communication between an attorney and its insurer may be privileged, it found no such 
circumstances in this case. 232 Referring to its earlier decision in FTC v. TRW, Inc.,233 the court 
stated the following:
We stressed that the critical factor for purposes of the attorney-client privilege 
was that the communication be made “in confidence for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice from the lawyer…We cautioned restraint, however, lest the privilege 
be construed to engulf “all manner of services” that should not be summarily 
excluded from the adversary process.234
The court noted that an insurer may have different interests from those of the attorney.235 In such 
a case, the insurer could not possibly be an agent of the attorney.236 The court accordingly found 
that Linde Thomson could not meet the “relatively rigorous standards” of the attorney-client 
privilege.237
A case similar to Linde Thomson is Heavin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, decided by
the Kansas District Court.238 The court in Heavin reached the same conclusion that the D.C. 
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Circuit had in Linde Thomson.239 The court considered Duane Heavin’s Motion to Compel 
Production of Documents against Owens-Corning, finding that Owens-Corning failed to show 
that the documents it alleged were privileged actually contained legal advice.240 Again, an 
insurer was involved.241 Documents had been sent between Miles Mustain, the attorney for 
Owens-Corning, and Crawford & Company, Owens-Corning’s insurer.242 The court stated the 
following:
Defendant states “Crawford & Company was the independent contractor acting as 
Owen [sic] Corning’s agent for the purpose of handling all worker’s 
compensation claims.” An unsupported claim of agency relationship such as this, 
however, is insufficient for the Court to find Crawford & Company stands in the 
shoes of the client for purposes of confidential communications relating to legal 
advice.
As an independent contractor handling Defendant’s worker’s 
compensation claims, it is likely that Crawford & Company reviewed and 
considered documents relating to Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim for a 
myriad of business reasons other than seeking out legal advice.243
Owens-Corning failed to show that Crawford & Company was its agent, which would have 
potentially put the insurance company within the attorney-client privilege, and it also failed to 
establish that the subject matter of the communication was legal advice, which is also a 
requirement for privilege protection.
The Third Circuit decided U.S. v. Alvarez based on an application of Kovel. 244 Although 
the court incorrectly blended the attorney-client privilege with the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, it did rely on Kovel when it compared the assistance of an 
accountant to the assistance of a medical expert, in this case a psychiatrist.245 The court saw “no 
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distinction between the need of defense counsel for expert assistance in accounting matters and 
the same need in matters of psychiatry.”246
As demonstrated in the cases cited above (Ackert, In re: Bieter, Horton, Linde Thomson, 
Heavin, and Alvarez), courts have indeed been reluctant to extend the holding of Kovel to grant 
the attorney-client privilege to nonattorneys. What can be discovered from the cases above is 
that courts will not extend the privilege to communications with nonattorneys unless the 
nonattorneys are performing an interpreting function, or unless the nonattorneys are acting as 
agents (or the functional equivalents of employees) of the client. Further, the attorney involved 
must be providing legal services, not simply business services.
B. Other Public Relations Cases
The question of whether public relations tasks fall within the attorney-client privilege 
has been the focus of only a handful of cases. Most courts have found that public relations 
communications do not give rise to the privilege.247 In Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Laboratories, Inc., the district court held that a memorandum on media disclosures was not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege because it concerned business advice rather than legal 
advice.248 Similarly, in Rattner v. Netburn, a public announcement (press release) was ruled not 
privileged.249 The district court in Rattner quoted the following from Weinstein’s Evidence:
. . . The privilege governs the performance of duties by the attorney as legal 
counselor, and if he chooses to undertake additional duties on behalf of his client 
that cannot be so characterized, those activities and communications in 
furtherance of them are not privileged.250
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A case where a district court found that the attorney-client privilege applied to 
discussions between a civil defendant and its counsel despite the participation of a public 
relations consultant is H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. The William Carter Co.251 Unfortunately, the 
reported case involved a discovery dispute, and the court did not extensively analyze its finding. 
It is significant, however, that the court specified that “[t]he public relations consultants 
participated to assist the lawyers in rendering legal advice, which included how defendant 
should respond to plaintiff’s lawsuit.”252
In a patent and trademark action filed by Labatt Brewing Company against Molson 
Breweries, the Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit ruled that a public relations consultant 
assisting Labatt was required to produce notes taken during its meeting with Labatt’s General 
Counsel.253 Judge Patterson granted Molson’s motion to compel.254 In his Order, he stated the 
following:
The documents are notes of personnel of the independent advertising agencies 
representing Plaintiffs made [sic] at a meeting scheduled to assist them in 
marketing and advertising Plaintiffs’ product, “Ice Beer”; Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
were present at this meeting. There has been no showing that the Third Parties 
were seeking legal advice at the meeting. Rather, it appears that Plaintiffs were 
briefing the personnel of the Third Parties so that the content of the advertising 
placed by the agencies would not undercut the theories expounded in the [related] 
litigation.255
The circuit court affirmed Judge Patterson’s Order.256
The dissent filed in the case by Judge Newman is interesting. She analyzed the case 
under a completely different theory, an agency theory.257 She cited to the Kovel, In re Bieter 
251
 H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. The William Carter Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
252 Id., at 7 and 8 LEXIS.
253
 John Labatt Limited v. Molson Breweries, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d Dorf & 
Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
254 Id., at 4  LEXIS.
255 Id., at 3 and 4 LEXIS.
256 Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
31
Co., and H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. cases, concluding that Dorf and Stanton Communications, 
Inc., Labatt’s public relations consultant, was actually an agent of Labatt, the plaintiff.258 As 
such, she found the communication covered by the attorney-client privilege, because Dorf and 
Stanton was operating as an agent of the client.259 She also determined that “[t]he information 
recorded in the notes is directly concerned with litigation issues, is confidential legal advice and 
[is] litigation information.”260
Judge Kaplan, in the Grand Jury March 24 case extensively discussed two cases that 
involved public relations consultants, the Calvin Klein Trademark Trust and the In re: Copper 
Market Antitrust cases.261 In Calvin Klein Trademark Trust, Judge Rakoff of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York denied Calvin Klein’s assertion of the attorney-
client privilege with respect to documents and testimony requested by the defendant.262 The 
defendant sought documents and testimony from Robinson Lerer & Montgomery (RLM), a 
public relations firm.263 The law firm representing Calvin Klein had retained RLM in 
anticipation of filing the lawsuit before the court.264 Calvin Klein had itself independently 
retained RLM some nine months earlier.265 Calvin Klein claimed that RLM was retained by the 
law firm in order to understand public reaction to the lawsuit, to provide legal advice, and to 
“assure that the media crisis that would ensue – including responses to requests by the media 
about the law suit [sic] and the overall dispute between the companies – would be handled 
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responsibly.”266 The district court held that Calvin Klein failed to prove that the privilege 
applied for three reasons.267 First, the court found that the purpose of the communication was 
not to obtain legal advice.268 The court quoted from the Ackert case when it stated, “the 
privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that 
prove important to an attorney’s legal advice to a client.”269 The court’s second point was that 
RLM did not serve a “translator” function as the accountant had in Kovel.270 The public 
relations firm reviewed press coverage, made calls to the media, and found “friendly” 
reporters.271 Judge Rakoff stated the following:
The possibility that such activity may also have been helpful to [the law firm] in 
formulating legal strategy is neither here nor there if RLM’s work and advice 
simply serves to assist counsel in assessing the probable public reaction to various 
strategic alternatives, as opposed to enabling counsel to understand aspects of the 
client’s own communications that could not otherwise be appreciated in the 
rendering of legal advice.272
Finally, the court’s third rationale was that the privilege is to be narrowly construed, and if the 
court allowed a privilege in this circumstance, it would be tantamount to allowing a public 
relations privilege.273 The court was unwilling to stretch the attorney-client privilege to such an 
extent.274
The Copper Market Antitrust case was also decided by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, in this case by Judge Swain.275 In September 1999, Viacom, 
Inc. and Emerson Electric Co. (Viacom) filed suit against Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo), 
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alleging that Sumitomo conspired to manipulate the world copper market.276 Sumitomo had 
earlier hired public relations firm Robinson Lerer & Montgomery (RLM – the same firm that 
appeared in the Calvin Klein litigation above) because it anticipated both litigation and an 
investigation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) following the deposition 
of a Sumitomo executive by the CFTC.277 The court found as a fact that Sumitomo lacked prior 
experience dealing with publicity, and that it had no experience dealing with the Western 
media.278 Of the three Sumitomo executives in their Communications Department, only two 
spoke English, and their language skills “were not sufficiently sophisticated for media 
relations.”279
Viacom subpoenaed documents from RLM that related to its public relations work for 
Sumitomo.280 Some 15,000 pages of documents were produced, and a privilege log was 
submitted for those documents not released.281 In the privilege log, RLM asserted the attorney-
client privilege.282 Instead of analyzing the case from a Kovel standpoint, the court relied on the 
In re: Bieter and Upjohn cases.283 Ultimately, the court found that RLM was the “functional 
equivalent of a Sumitomo employee.”284 In footnote four of the opinion, the court distinguishes
the Calvin Klein case by finding that the law firm hired the public relations consultant in Calvin 
Klein, whereas the client hired the public relations consultant in Copper Market Antitrust.285
The court found that “for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, RLM can fairly be equated 
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with the [sic] Sumitomo for purposes of analyzing the availability of the attorney-client 
privilege to protect communications to which RLM was a party concerning its scandal-related 
duties.”286 One area rather quickly glossed over by the court is the question of whether the 
communication was legal advice. The court simply states, “[I]n addition, RLM’s 
communications concerned matters within the scope of RLM’s duties for Sumitomo, and RLM 
employees were aware that the communications were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice 
from” Sumitomo’s attorneys.287 It is difficult to determine how RLM, a public relations firm,
discussed legal issues with Sumitomo’s lawyers, in some instances in the absence of 
Sumitomo.288
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit adopted the Copper Market 
Antitrust reasoning in a case it decided involving public relations consultants.289
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) resisted a subpoena from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on 
grounds that the communication was protected by the attorney-client privilege.290 The FTC 
argued that GSK waived the privilege when it shared the documents with their “public relations 
and government affairs consultants.”291 The district court agreed.292 The circuit court reversed 
because it found that the consultants were “integral members of the team assigned to deal with 
issues [that]…were completely intertwined with [GSK’s] litigation and legal strategies.”293
Again, this holding was based upon the finding that the consultants were actually an agent of 
the client.
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An interesting case also involving the claim of attorney-client privilege for public 
relations communications is Amway Corporation v. The Procter & Gamble Co.294 This case was 
one of several lawsuits between Amway and Procter and Gamble.295 Procter and Gamble 
claimed that Amway was the source of a rumor that Procter and Gamble was associated with the 
Church of Satan.296 The rumor began in the late 1970s, and because of it, Proctor and Gamble 
was ultimately forced to change its crescent-shaped man-in-the-moon logo.297 Amway brought a 
motion to compel the production of documents during its malicious prosecution action against 
Procter and Gamble.298 Some of the requested documents were communications made by “a 
group of Procter & Gamble employees formed to deal with the public relations aspects of the 
Satanism rumors.”299 The group, according to the Court, was frustrated because the rumors were 
being repeated by members of the clergy and others who were “unlikely targets for a 
lawsuit.”300 Instead, “the company was eager to blame a competitor for fostering the rumor, 
principally (but perhaps not solely) to enhance Procter & Gamble’s competitive and public 
relations position in the marketplace.”301
The Court granted the motion to compel, because it found that Procter & Gamble failed 
to meet its “heavy burden” to “make a clear showing that counsel is acting in a professional 
legal capacity and that the document reflects legal, as opposed to business, advice.”302 The case 
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is different from the Calvin Klein and In re: Copper Market Antitrust, because the public 
relations functions were performed by employees, not outside firms. However, the Court found 
that Procter & Gamble failed to meet the second requirement of the analysis, that the 
communication concern legal advice.303
A United States District Court, in Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., was asked to 
review a Magistrate’s finding that the attorney-client privilege failed to apply to certain 
documents prepared by R.J. Reynolds’ (RJR) attorneys.304 Interestingly, neither outside nor 
inside public relations consultants were involved in the case.305 The communications originated 
from the attorneys and concerned “public relations and public image issues.”306 The Court held 
that attorneys may perform nonlegal functions and, when they do so, the communications are 
not within the attorney-client privilege.307 The Court stated the following:
Thus, while these documents were all written or prepared by RJR attorneys (either 
inside or outside counsel), the documents make no reference to legal issues or the 
rendering of legal advice. Document 58, for example, is a draft of a position paper 
regarding carbon monoxide and cigarette smoking prepared for the purpose of 
responding to questions or rebutting criticisms stemming from certain (negative) 
FTC test results concerning the levels of carbon monoxide in commercial 
cigarettes. While the position paper was prepared by RJR’s outside counsel, it was 
not prepared in the course of rendering legal advice. It could have been prepared 
by scientists, tobacco industry non-legal personnel, or others with access to the 
non-legal literature cited in the paper. In short, on its face the position paper was 
intended for public relations purposes rather than legal purposes.308 (emphasis 
added)
Other documents were drafted by scientists and given to RJR’s lawyers.309 Although RJR 
argued that these scientific reports were directed to the lawyers because they needed to be “kept 
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advised and updated on various scientific developments for purposes of monitoring legislative, 
regulatory, and litigation threats,” the Court countered that the documents “contain[ed] no 
accompanying request for any legal advice whatsoever.”310
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had yet another 
opportunity to analyze public relations and the attorney-client privilege in Haugh v. Schroder 
Investment Management.311 This case was decided approximately two months after the Grand 
Jury March 24 case, and was decided by Judge Cote.312 Sharon Haugh, the former Chairperson 
of Schroder Investment Management Co. (Schroder) sued Schroder for age discrimination. 313
When she was fired, articles about her departure appeared in industry publications.314 Ms. 
Haugh’s attorney, Mr. Arkin, retained Laura Murray, a public relations consultant who also 
happened to be an attorney, to “provide us advice to assist us in providing legal services to Ms. 
Haugh.”315 Schroder filed a motion to compel the production of documents against Haugh 
because Haugh had claimed the attorney-client privilege and refused to produce the documents 
she had earlier sent to Murray.316 The Court noted that none of the documents at issue 
originated with Arkin.317 All of the requested documents except one were sent from Haugh to 
Murray.318 Many of these were also sent to Arkin.319 The other document was sent from Murray 
directly to Arkin.320
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The Court began its analysis by citing Kovel, but it also cited another Second Circuit 
case in which that Court had found that the attorney-client privilege “should be narrowly 
construed and expansions cautiously extended.”321 The District Court noted that there was 
limited precedent dealing with the application of the attorney-client privilege to public relations 
consultants.322 It found as a fact that the duties performed by Murray were ordinary public 
relations duties, just like those at issue in the Calvin Klein case.323 Although the retention letter 
between Arkin and Murray indicated that Murray was to assist Arkin to provide legal advice to 
Haugh, the Court found that there was an absence of a nexus between the consultant’s work and 
the attorney’s work.324 The Court acknowledged the Grand Jury March 24 case, but indicated 
that there was no need to determine whether that case was correctly decided.325 Judge Cote 
stated the following:
A media campaign is not a litigation strategy. Some attorneys may feel it is 
desirable at times to conduct a media campaign, but that decision does not 
transform their coordination of a campaign into legal advice.326
Interestingly, the Court later found the documents privileged, not because they were protected 
under the attorney-client privilege, but because they were privileged under the attorney work 
product privilege.327
One can make some general observations about the few cases that have been decided 
concerning public relations consultants and the attorney-client privilege. Courts have been 
willing to protect communications when the public relations consultants are agents or the 
“functional equivalent of employees” of the client, for example in the Carter, Copper Market 
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Antitrust, and GlaxoSmithKline cases. In those three cases, the Courts found that the subject 
matter of the communications was legal advice, but in each case, the Courts gave the issue only 
a passing glance. Conversely, in the Burroughs Wellcome, Rattner, Dorf & Stanton 
Communications, Calvin Klein, Amway, Burton, and Haugh cases, the Courts found that the 
communications were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the subject matter 
was not legal advice.
C.. Legal Advice
In the Grand Jury March 24 case, Judge Kaplan cites Kovel for the proposition that “the 
privilege in appropriate circumstances extends to otherwise privileged communications that 
involve persons assisting the lawyer in the rendition of legal services.”328 The court then finds 
that in the particular case before it, the attorneys retained the public relations firm to assist them 
in rendering legal advice.329 The court frames the issue as follows:
The ultimate issue therefore resolves to whether attorney efforts to influence 
public opinion in order to advance the client’s legal position – in this case by 
neutralizing what the attorneys perceived as a climate of opinion pressing 
prosecutors and regulators to act in ways adverse to Target’s interests – are 
services, the rendition of which also should be facilitated by applying the 
privilege to relevant communications which have this as their object.330
In the In re Lindsay case, a case involving then President Bill Clinton’s attorney, the 
court stated that the attorney-client privilege applies only if the person to whom the 
communication is made is a member of the bar, is acting as a lawyer, and “the communication 
was made “for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal 
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding.”331 Some courts have insisted that the 
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communication relate “solely” to the purpose of providing legal advice, but most courts agree 
that the privilege applies if the “primary or predominant purpose of the attorney-client 
consultation is to seek legal advice or assistance.”332  The attorney must be acting as a legal 
advisor.333 If business and legal advice are intertwined, the legal advice must predominate.334 If 
legal advice is merely incidental to business advice, the attorney-client privilege will not 
apply.335
Although courts agree that legal advice must be the primary purpose of the 
communication, two views emerge about the focus of the purpose.336 The first view, which is 
the majority view, focuses on “the predominant purpose behind a particular form of 
communication.”337 The privilege is extended only if the primary purpose underlying the 
conversation is legal advice.338 For example, in U.S. v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), 
the court used this analysis in deciding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply.339 In 
Alcoa, the President of Alcoa requested a report from an employee.340 After this request, but 
before the employee delivered the report, the attorney requested the report.341 The court found 
that the report was “nothing more than an inter-office memo passing between two business 
executives.”342 This is indeed how the report originated.
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The second approach is one that “focuses on the segregable portions of each 
communication in which legal advice or assistance has been sought.”343 If an attorney is 
providing both legal and business advice, the court will segregate out the business advice and 
allow only the legal advice the privilege.344 Therefore, under the first approach, the entire 
communication is protected as long as the predominant purpose is legal advice. If it is not, the 
communication is not protected at all. The second approach allows partial protection via the 
attorney-client privilege as long as the communication is severable.
Under either approach, the court must still determine what exactly constitutes legal 
advice. The attorney must be acting in a “legal capacity, rather than perform[ing] any of the 
other functions that law-trained individuals in our society are wont to do.”345 The type of service 
that he/she performs is of the manner that his/her education and certification enable him/her to 
do.346 The privilege protects legal advice, and does not extend to business advice.347 The 
Supreme Court has held that “it protects only those disclosures – necessary to obtain informed 
legal advice – which might not have been made absent the privilege.”348 The privilege applies 
when “an attorney is giving advice concerning the legal implications of conduct, whether past 
or proposed.”349 It applies only when an attorney acts in his/her capacity as an attorney.350
Unfortunately, the case law is less than clear on what exactly constitutes legal advice. 
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It is fairly well settled that investment advice, tax return preparation, the transmission of 
funds, and advice on product marketing do not constitute legal advice.351 Many times, however, 
the line between business or tax advice versus legal advice is blurred. The problem is especially 
pronounced when the attorney gives both business and legal advice or if the attorney is in-house 
counsel at a corporation.352 Given the varied tasks that lawyers perform, “legal advice “is often
intimately intertwined with and difficult to distinguish from business advice.”353 Professor 
Wigmore recognized that the line between legal and nonlegal advice was not easily drawn.354
He suggested a presumption in favor of a finding of legal advice, which could be rebutted by a 
clear showing that the communication was not in fact legal advice.355 Not all courts have 
followed his suggestion.356 Indeed, “[s]ome courts…have imposed a heavy burden on 
corporations seeking to protect communications with persons holding dual legal/nonlegal 
roles.”357 In two cases, the court suggested that a factor to consider was whether the task 
performed could have been performed by a nonlawyer.358 Other courts have explicitly rejected 
this as a factor.359
As indicated above, in most of the cases involving public relations consultants, courts 
have decided the cases based upon whether or not the communication actually concerned legal 
advice. In the Grand Jury March 24 case, Judge Kaplan makes the broad statement, “[b]ut it is 
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common ground that the privilege extends to communications involving consultants used by 
lawyers to assist in performing tasks that go beyond advising a client as to the law.”360 Although 
Judge Kaplan did not cite to any authority for this proposition, he indicated that Kovel framed 
the issue, and he used jury consultants as an example of this “common ground.”361 Again, Judge 
Kaplan did not cite to any authority for his statement that jury consultants are covered by the 
attorney-client privilege.362 He indicated that the government in the case had stipulated to such a 
fact.363 In actuality, if statements made to jury consultants are protected, they are protected 
under the attorney work product doctrine, not the attorney-client privilege.364
Judge Kaplan opined that times have changed. Traditionally, he said, the lawyer’s role 
with respect to public opinion was very limited, because even the appearance of attempting to 
influence jury pools was prohibited by the bar.365 Judge Kaplan cites two authorities for his 
finding that times have changed, and that the public relations consultants in issue were assisting 
the lawyers in providing legal advice.366 First, he cites to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.367 Specifically, Judge Kaplan cited to the following passage:
An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she 
cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client…so 
too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client’s reputation and 
reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a 
prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A defense 
attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or 
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reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of 
public opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried.368 (emphasis added)
Justice Kennedy was joined in this part (Part II) of the Gentile opinion by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens.369 The second point that Judge Kaplan relied upon is that courts have 
compensated lawyers for public relations efforts when awarding attorney fees.370 Judge Kaplan 
ultimately determined that these public relations duties qualified as legal advice.371 Judge Kaplan 
failed to recognize that attorneys are often compensated for performing duties that do not include 
legal advice. 
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court did not join Justice Kennedy in Part II of the 
Gentile opinion.372 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion for Part II of the 
opinion, and he cited to Sheppard v. Maxwell, a case that captivated the citizenry of Ohio and the 
rest of the nation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.373 In the Sheppard case, Dr. Sam Sheppard 
was accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death.374 The Supreme Court emphasized the 
“insatiable interest of the American public” in the case,375 and finding that the trial judge did not 
protect Mr. Sheppard from the prejudicial publicity, it ordered him released.376 In Gentile, Justice
Rehnquist quoted from the Sheppard case, stating that collaboration between lawyers and the 
press not only could be regulated, but could also be censured.377
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D. Ethical Issues
The American Bar Association relied upon the Sheppard opinion in tightening the 
restrictions on a lawyer’s ability to make public statements about his or her case.378 The ABA 
Disciplinary Rule 7-107, passed just two years after the Court’s opinion in Sheppard, materially 
restricted statements lawyers could publicly make.379 Lawyers were prohibited from making an 
extrajudicial statement380 that the lawyer knew or reasonably should have known would have a 
“substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”381 Material 
prejudice was defined very broadly. According to the Rule, a statement was ordinarily likely to 
prejudice if it referred to a criminal matter and the statement related to the character, credibility 
and/or reputation of a party in a criminal matter.382 Additionally, under the Ethical 
Considerations contained in the rules, lawyers were required to completely refrain from making 
extrajudicial statements.383
In 1978, the ABA produced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.384 Model Rule 3.6 
referred to trial publicity, prohibiting lawyers from “giving information to the media when they 
know or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”385 Although the Supreme Court in Gentile approved a 
Nevada ethical rule that was substantially similar to that Model Rule, the Rule was amended in 
378
 John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers’ Duty to Balance News Coverage of their 
Clients, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 77, 93, Winter 2002.
379
 American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility, D.R. 7-107 (1968).
380
 Extrajudicial statements refers to statements which are given or effected outside of the course of a 
regular judicial proceeding. Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., at 698.
381
 American Bar Association, Model Code, supra.
382 Id.
383
 American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 7-29.
384
 Watson, supra., at 94.
385 Id.
46
1994 in response to the Court’s Gentile opinion.386 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 now 
provides that a lawyer “shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”387 A
lawyer, however, is allowed to make a statement that is required in order to protect a client from 
the prejudicial effect of publicity, but only as necessary to mitigate the adverse publicity.388 This 
has been referred to as the “fair reply” provision.389 This amendment was a written recognition 
by the American Bar Association that lawyers have a need to correct the public record about any 
adverse publicity their client may be receiving.
The Supreme Court first realized that trial publicity could affect the result in a trial in the 
Sheppard case. In fact, they let a man out of prison because of the adverse publicity.390 In 
Gentile, the Court recognized an attorney’s right to free speech, but also indicated that the bar 
could regulate this speech.391 The amendment was really a response to Justice Kennedy’s 
minority opinion, in which he stated, “petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity he 
perceived as prejudicing potential jurors against his client and injuring his client’s reputation in 
the community.”392 We now have a fair reply provision. Attempting to influence prosecutors and 
regulators goes far beyond a fair reply. Attempting to influence the public also appears to go 
beyond a fair reply, unless a lawyer is correcting past adverse publicity. Today celebrities are 
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hiring public relations consultants at the first sign of trouble in an attempt to protect their 
reputations, not simply to clarify what may be unfair publicity.
E. Type of Public Relations Advice
In the Grand Jury March 24 case, the court distinguished the Calvin Klein case by stating 
that in Calvin Klein, ordinary public relations advice was at issue, whereas in the Grand Jury 
March 24 case, the public relations firm’s task was “defensive.”393 The Court found that the 
defense attorneys used the public relations consultants in order to “neutralize the environment” 
so that prosecutors and regulators would make their decisions without “undue influence” from 
the negative press the target had received.394 The audience the public relations consultants hoped 
to reach was not the “public at large,” but rather regulators and prosecutors.395 This appears to go 
beyond the bounds of the ethical rules, as this particular action goes further than simply a “fair 
reply.” More importantly, although this activity may be within an attorney’s responsibilities, it is 
difficult to stretch the nature of this activity to be “legal advice.” This is particularly true in the 
situation when the communications take place between the public relations consultants and the 
target, when the attorneys are not even in attendance. Judge Kaplan protected this 
communication as well.396 In what way could the communication contain legal advice? If legal 
advice was disseminated, then the public relations consultants would be guilty of practicing law 
without a license.
393
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III. Comparison of Public Relations Cases with the History and Purposes of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege
Dean Wigmore recognized that the public has a right to “every man’s evidence.”397 The 
restrictions on this maxim were to be exceptional.398 Because of the belief that no client would 
dare consult a lawyer unless their communications were guarded, the attorney-client privilege 
has become such an exception. As Lord Brougham observed in Greenough v. Gaskell, if the 
privilege did not exist, each client would be forced to rely on his or her own knowledge of the 
law, which of course is limited.399 The privilege is a protection for the client, so that he or she 
receives the benefit of one schooled in the law, with the assurance that the attorney has been 
provided with all of the pertinent facts. 
The Advisory Committee on drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence reflected the
conservative beliefs of Wigmore.400 As Professor Cleary said, privileges often operate to block
the search for truth.401 The Supreme Court also has indicated that privileges are not favored.402
On the other hand, candor between an attorney and his or her client is absolutely essential in 
order to have an effective assistance of counsel.403
How do communications with public relations consultants compare with communications 
with lawyers when viewed in the light of the history and purpose of the attorney-client privilege? 
If the assistance of a public relations consultant was necessary in order to interpret complex 
material for the attorney, surely the purpose of the attorney-client privilege would be served, as it 
was in the Kovel case, and even perhaps in the Copper Market Antitrust case. However, 
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understanding public relations issues is not comparable to understanding the complex Internal 
Revenue Code, as was the case in Kovel. The Copper Market Antitrust case involved non-native 
speaking Japanese clients.404 The public relations consultants served a translator function 
because the executives at Sumitomo were unfamiliar with the American media.405 There are very 
limited situations in which a public relations consultant would serve a translator function.
Unless the translator function is at issue, it is difficult to see how the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege could be met for public relations communications . The privilege 
protects the free exchange of information that otherwise would not take place in its absence. In 
order for the attorneys to provide the best legal advice, all of the facts, both favorable and 
unfavorable, must be made known to him or her. This is not true of a public relations consultant.
A client need not divulge incriminating information in order to receive effective media advice.
Many courts have analyzed public relations cases under an agency theory. If the client 
brings in either an inside or outside public relations consultant, courts have been willing to treat 
the consultant as “the functional equivalent of an employee.” This analysis was used in the 
Copper Market Antitrust and the GlaxoSmithKline cases. However, having an attorney-client 
relationship is not the only requirement of the privilege. There are other requirements, as set 
forth by Wigmore. The element of confidentiality is essential.406 Because the purpose of hiring 
public relations consultants is to transmit information to the public, it is indeed difficult to see 
how these communications could be termed confidential. Even in the In re Grand Jury March 24 
case, in which the court found the audience was not the public at large but the prosecutors and 
regulators, the absence of a communication made in confidence is obvious. The Wigmorian 
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conditions also require a relationship that ought to be “sedulously fostered.” 407 Although the 
attorney–client relationship must be fostered, the public relations consultant-client relationship 
need not be. Wigmore also believed that the cost of a privilege must be compared to the benefit
of that privilege. When the cost of the attorney-client privilege is compared to the benefit, judges 
and scholars have agreed that the cost, loss of truth, is worth the benefit, the free exchange of 
pertinent information. It is difficult to imagine a case in which the benefit of public relations 
advice exceeds the cost of the loss of pertinent information.
Judge Wyzanski, who wrote the U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.  case, listed several 
requirements of the attorney-client privilege.408 These requirements, adopted by numerous 
courts409, are as follows:
1. The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 
2. The person to whom the communication was made 
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and 
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; 
3. The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed 
(a) by his client 
(b) without the presence of strangers 
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either 
(i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or 
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not 
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and 
4. The privilege has been 
(a) claimed and 
(b) not waived by the client.410
When courts have analyzed public relations cases under the agency theory, they have determined 
that the public relations consultants are agents either of the client or the attorney. Some courts 
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have missed the essential second step. The communication must contain legal advice.  The courts 
in Copper Market Antitrust and GlaxoSmithKline failed to perform the second necessary step of 
the analysis. Even if the public relations consultants are an agent or a “functional equivalent of 
an employee,” the communications are not privileged if the communications do not contain legal 
advice. As set forth by Judge Wyzanski, that legal advice could be an opinion on law, legal 
services, or assistance in a legal proceeding. There was no such finding in Copper Market 
Antitrust or GlaxoSmithKline.
The In re Grand Jury March 24 case, Judge Kaplan did specifically find that legal advice 
was disseminated. Judge Kaplan believed that times have changed, and that part of an attorney’s 
function for his or her client is to attempt to influence prosecutors and regulators. Although 
Judge Kaplan cites to the words of Justice Kennedy for his finding, he fails to make the 
distinction between the role an attorney may and should play and that attorney’s task of 
providing legal advice. Not all communications between an attorney and a client are privileged. 
Only those communications concerning legal advice are protected. Communications concerning 
such things as tax preparation, marketing advice, and investment advice are specifically not 
protected. Nor should they be. It is the unique advice that only a lawyer is able to give a client is 
what is and should be protected. Attorneys perform many services for their clients; some services 
are nonlegal in nature. The protection afforded a privilege is to be as narrowly applied as 
possible in order to meet the purpose of the privilege.
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IV. Expanding the Attorney-Client Privilege to Public Relations Consultants is Inadvisable and 
Against the Interests of Justice
High-profile cases have been in the news for some time now. Lizzie Bordon was tried in 
1893,411 the Rosenberg trial took place in 1951,412 the Sheppard murder occurred in 1954,413 and 
Charles Manson was before a court in 1970.414 The use of public relations consultants is of more 
recent vintage. In the mid-1990’s, John and Patsy Ramsey hired both attorneys and public 
relations consultants when they were suspected of murdering their daughter JonBenet.415 In fact, 
the Governor of Colorado challenged the Ramseys to stop hiding behind their public relations 
firm.416 Both Michael Milken, the junk bond king, and Clark Clifford, a former Presidential 
Cabinet Secretary, hired public relations firms in order to fend off indictments.417
Certainly a lawyer may and should consider using public relations consultants in high-
profile cases. One could even argue that it is an attorney’s ethical obligation to attempt to 
influence public opinion. It is another question entirely whether communications with public 
relations agents ought to be privileged. Privileges limit the information that the judge and jury 
receive. Privileges impede the search for truth. They are to be restricted to the narrowest possible 
limits.418 The privileges that exist are there to foster certain relationships; for example, between 
spouses or between attorney and client. Clients must feel free to discuss their case, or they will 
be left to their own devices. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that privileges should be 
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governed by common law, in light of reason and experience. This rule does allow for the growth 
of privileges. However, this growth must be tempered by reason and experience. The extension 
of the attorney-client privilege to communications with public relations consultants is not logical. 
The purposes behind the privilege do not extend to such communications. To allow the privilege 
to this extent would essentially allow a public relations consultant-client privilege. Comparing 
the cost of such a privilege to the benefit of the privilege, one finds that the cost is simply too 
great. The fact that communications with public relations agents are not protected will not deter 
clients from consulting with them. 
High-profile clients now engage public relations consultants as well as attorneys when 
they are facing indictment and criminal and civil trials. These clients hope to influence both 
those inside the judicial system and those outside of it, the public. Given the media circus that 
often accompanies these clients, such a strategy makes good sense. However, the protection of 
this communication is against the whole history and purpose of privilege law. Because they 
impede truth, privileges are to be strictly construed.419 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated “[p]rivileges are based upon the idea that certain societal values are more important than 
the search for truth.”420 Communications between attorneys and clients rise to the level of 
important social values. The attorney needs to be aware of all of the facts of the case in order to 
adequately represent the client, and the client needs to be assured that by disclosing these facts, 
he or she is not sealing their own fate. On the other hand, there is little societal benefit in a client 
seeking the services of a public relations consultant in order to put the right spin on certain facts. 
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The service the public relations experts perform simply does not rise to the same level in terms 
of societal importance.
V. Conclusion
The use of public relations consultants in connection with high-profile cases will 
undoubtedly continue. Public relations firms are advertising that their advice is necessary when
celebrities face criminal charges. It is beyond speculation that such advice may be helpful, but 
should such advice be protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege? Privileges 
are to be recognized “only within the narrowest limits required by principle.”421 Clients surely 
will continue to consult public relations consultants even if their communications are subject to 
discovery. Public relations experts will continue to receive accurate information from clients 
even if communications are not protected by privilege. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated “privileges obstruct the truth-finding process and provide benefits that are at best indirect 
and speculative.”422 Public relations consultants do not provide legal advice. They are retained 
for the very purpose of transmitting information to the public. The communications are not 
meant to be confidential. The lack of a privilege will not deter clients from consulting the public 
relations experts. Retaining a public relations consultant may be, as Martha Stewart would say, 
“a good thing.” Protection of those communications, however, is not a good thing.
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